ThinkTankWeekly

From chokepoint to crisis: The Strait of Hormuz and global oil markets

Brookings | 2026-06-12 | energy

Topics: China, Middle East, Trade, United States

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English Summary

The Strait of Hormuz—through which 20% of global oil flows—has been effectively closed by Iranian attacks and tolls since February 2026, causing the largest supply disruption in oil market history (14+ mbd lost, gasoline at $4.31/gallon as of June). While strategic reserves and alternative pipelines temporarily cushion the shock, market normalization will take months even if the strait reopens due to infrastructure damage and depleted inventories. The closure threatens freedom of navigation globally, as Iran's toll system ($1/barrel) risks inspiring similar charges at other critical chokepoints (Malacca, Gibraltar), and short-term policy measures (gas tax holidays, export bans) would be counterproductive rather than effective.

中文摘要

霍爾木茲海峽是全球20%石油流動的關鍵通道。自2026年2月以來,該海峽因伊朗的攻擊和徵收費用而實質性封閉,引發了石油市場史上最大的供應中斷(損失超過14百萬桶/日,截至六月,汽油價格達每加侖4.31美元)。雖然戰略儲備和替代管道暫時緩解了衝擊,但即使海峽重新開放,市場恢復正常也需要數月時間,原因包括基礎設施的損壞和庫存的耗盡。此次封閉威脅到全球航行自由,因為伊朗的徵費制度(每桶1美元)可能激發其他關鍵要衝(如馬六甲、直布羅陀)採取類似的收費措施。此外,短期政策措施(如燃油稅假期、出口禁令)將是適得其反,而非有效的解決方案。

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