The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Flagpole to Front Lines: A Warfighter-Driven Requirements Process
English Summary
RAND proposes the Flagpole to Front Lines (F2FL) framework to replace the outdated JCIDS military requirements process, emphasizing problem-centric innovation over technology-driven acquisition. F2FL traces national security objectives through operational tasks to specific capability requirements using iterative agile sprints (conceptualize, build, finalize), creating transparent linkage and reducing bureaucratic complexity. By identifying operational problems first and enabling early industry collaboration, the approach accelerates capability delivery while maintaining strategic coherence. This is particularly relevant to the complex security environment the U.S. faces, including Indo-Pacific deterrence and homeland defense priorities outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy.
中文摘要
蘭德公司提出「旗桿到前線」(F2FL)框架，以取代過時的JCIDS軍事需求流程，強調以問題為中心的創新，而非技術驅動的採購。F2FL通過迭代敏捷衝刺（概念化、構建、最終化）將國家安全目標與作戰任務聯繫到具體的能力需求，建立透明的關聯並減少官僚複雜性。通過優先識別作戰問題並促進早期行業合作，該方法加快了能力交付，同時保持戰略一致性。這對美國面臨的複雜安全環境特別相關，包括2025年《國家安全戰略》中概述的印太威懾和本土防衛優先事項。
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