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Chatham House Prize 2025: A humanitarian lifeline in Sudan

Chatham House | 2026-03-19 | africa

Topics: Ukraine

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English Summary

The 2025 Chatham House Prize has been awarded to Sudan’s Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) for their vital humanitarian work during the country's ongoing civil war between the SAF and RSF. Operating in areas often inaccessible to international organizations, these grassroots networks provide essential food, water, and medical supplies while maintaining critical infrastructure under significant risk. This recognition underscores the indispensable role of localized, impartial mutual aid groups in addressing one of the world's largest displacement and humanitarian crises.

中文摘要

2025年查塔姆研究所獎(Chatham House Prize)已頒予蘇丹的「緊急應對小組」(Emergency Response Rooms, ERRs),以表彰其在該國蘇丹武裝部隊(SAF)與快速支援部隊(RSF)內戰期間所做出的關鍵人道主義貢獻。這些草根網絡在國際組織往往難以進入的地區運作,在面臨重大風險的情況下提供必要的糧食、飲水及醫療物資,並維持關鍵基礎設施。此項殊榮凸顯了在地化且公正的互助團體在應對全球最嚴重的流離失所與人道危機之一時,發揮了不可或缺的作用。

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