ThinkTankWeekly

Director of Chatham House UK in the World Programme gives evidence at Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee

Chatham House | 2026-06-12 | diplomacy

Topics: Trade

Visit original source

ThinkTankWeekly provides a curated entry and summary only. Full text and PDF remain on the publisher's website.

English Summary

Olivia O'Sullivan, Director of Chatham House's UK in the World Programme, testified before the UK Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee on the Integrated Security Fund and its role in addressing high-priority security threats. She highlighted the UK's shifting strategic security landscape driven by a massive contraction in global aid spending, forcing difficult trade-offs between immediate defence priorities, conflict prevention, and long-term complex risks. O'Sullivan warned that conflict-affected states risk being neglected under the new international aid environment and urged the government to ensure the centrally situated Integrated Security Fund is preserved through the FCDO restructure to enable long-term strategic investment. The testimony underscores the need for the UK to maintain institutional capacity for anticipating emerging threats even as budgetary pressures mount.

中文摘要

查塔姆研究所「英國與世界計畫」主任奧利維亞·奧沙利文(Olivia O'Sullivan)出席英國國會外交事務委員會,就「整合安全基金」及其在應對高優先安全威脅中的角色作證。她指出,全球援助支出大幅縮減正驅動英國戰略安全格局的轉變,迫使政府在即時國防優先事項、衝突預防與長期複雜風險之間做出艱難取捨。奧沙利文警告,在新的國際援助環境下,受衝突影響的國家面臨被忽視的風險,並敦促政府確保在外交、國協及發展事務部(FCDO)重組過程中,保留居於核心地位的整合安全基金,以實現長期戰略投資。此證詞凸顯英國在預算壓力日增之際,仍須維持預判新興威脅的制度能力。

Related Entries

  1. 1.
    2026-09-18 | economy | 2026-W38 | Topics: China, Middle East, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

    Congress has significantly expanded presidential tariff authority by passing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, allowing the executive to impose up to 100% tariffs on key buyers of Russian energy and sanctions enablers. The article argues that this legislation represents a dangerous abdication of Congress's Article I authority, as it grants the executive vast, discretionary power without specifying criteria for enforcement. Historically, the executive could claim tariffs were its own doing; however, by writing and passing this new authority, Congress now owns the resulting trade policy and its economic consequences. This shift implies that future tariffs will be viewed by the public as a direct legislative action, potentially undermining the administration's credibility and creating political vulnerability.

    Read at CATO

  2. 2.
    2026-09-17 | economy | 2026-W38 | Topics: Middle East, Russia, Trade, United States

    Cuba is on a trajectory toward an accelerating state and economic collapse, risking a point of no return. The state is deteriorating into "authoritarian anarchy," retaining its capacity for political repression but losing the ability to provide basic public services like health and safety. Economically, while the private sector is growing, this expansion is highly unequal, fueling cronyism and widening class gaps between the elite and the poor. If the current trend continues, the country risks calcifying these defects into a dysfunctional baseline, severely diminishing the chances of a stable, democratic transition.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  3. 3.
    2026-09-17 | china_indopacific | 2026-W38 | Topics: China, Europe, Russia, Trade

    The article argues that China's ongoing purges are not signs of weakness, but rather a sophisticated, historically rooted process of 'rectification' that strengthens the CCP's grip on power. This mechanism requires cadres to submit mandatory self-criticisms and build permanent, detailed personnel files (dossiers). This system of record-keeping is the CCP's primary source of resilience, creating profound, internalized discipline that controls internal dissent. Policymakers must recognize that the regime's durability stems from this deep internal control mechanism, making succession—rather than internal purges—the ultimate strategic vulnerability.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  4. 4.

    The analysis argues that contemporary warfare is marked by a return to great power competition, often fueled by strategic hubris and historical overconfidence. A key failure across modern conflicts is the 'short-war fallacy'—the assumption that overwhelming military force guarantees a quick, decisive victory. This mindset blinds policymakers to the need for sustained resource mobilization and complex political outcomes. Consequently, effective strategy requires linking military objectives with clear, comprehensive political goals, rather than pursuing rapid, decisive regime changes or military victories in isolation.

    Read at Foreign Affairs

  5. 5.
    2026-09-16 | tech | 2026-W38 | Topics: AI, Cybersecurity, Nuclear, Taiwan, Trade, United States

    The report argues that the rapid integration of AI creates novel and complex risks—such as deepfakes, misinformation, and intellectual property disputes—that do not fit within existing insurance lines, challenging the technology's overall insurability. Evidence shows that while lawsuits center on IP, the scope of harm is expanding into privacy and product liability, and insurers are responding unevenly with a mix of exclusions and limited coverage. Policymakers must therefore focus on managing systemic, correlated AI risks, including shared model dependencies and universal attacks, to prevent market failure and guide necessary regulatory oversight.

    Read at RAND