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Director of Chatham House UK in the World Programme gives evidence at Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee

Chatham House | 2026-06-12 | diplomacy

Topics: Trade

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English Summary

Olivia O'Sullivan, Director of Chatham House's UK in the World Programme, testified before the UK Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee on the Integrated Security Fund and its role in addressing high-priority security threats. She highlighted the UK's shifting strategic security landscape driven by a massive contraction in global aid spending, forcing difficult trade-offs between immediate defence priorities, conflict prevention, and long-term complex risks. O'Sullivan warned that conflict-affected states risk being neglected under the new international aid environment and urged the government to ensure the centrally situated Integrated Security Fund is preserved through the FCDO restructure to enable long-term strategic investment. The testimony underscores the need for the UK to maintain institutional capacity for anticipating emerging threats even as budgetary pressures mount.

中文摘要

查塔姆研究所「英國與世界計畫」主任奧利維亞·奧沙利文(Olivia O'Sullivan)出席英國國會外交事務委員會,就「整合安全基金」及其在應對高優先安全威脅中的角色作證。她指出,全球援助支出大幅縮減正驅動英國戰略安全格局的轉變,迫使政府在即時國防優先事項、衝突預防與長期複雜風險之間做出艱難取捨。奧沙利文警告,在新的國際援助環境下,受衝突影響的國家面臨被忽視的風險,並敦促政府確保在外交、國協及發展事務部(FCDO)重組過程中,保留居於核心地位的整合安全基金,以實現長期戰略投資。此證詞凸顯英國在預算壓力日增之際,仍須維持預判新興威脅的制度能力。

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