The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Air Force Wants New 1,000-Nautical Mile Range Missile for Air, Sea Targets
English Summary
The Air Force plans to develop a family of next-generation missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 nautical miles to strike air, land, and sea targets far and fast. This strategic push is driven by the necessity of countering China's advanced area denial networks and formidable air/naval forces in potential Western Pacific conflicts. By fielding these long-range systems, the U.S. aims to operationalize a comprehensive 'long-range kill chain,' significantly enhancing its power projection capabilities and maintaining deterrence against Beijing’s expanding military posture.
中文摘要
空軍計劃開發一系列射程超過 1,000 海里的下一代飛彈，以遠距離快速打擊空、地、海目標。這項戰略推動旨在應對潛在西太平洋衝突中中國先進的區域拒止網路和強大的空海武力。透過部署這些長程系統，美國旨在建立一套全面的「長程殺傷鏈」，顯著提升其力量投射能力，並維持對北京不斷擴張軍事態勢的威懾。
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