The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
There Is Only One Sphere of Influence
English Summary
The article challenges the notion of competing global spheres of influence, arguing instead that the United States maintains a singular and dominant sphere of influence. This dominance is rooted in the US's vast home region, which serves as a powerful, unconstrained hemispheric base. Consequently, American power and commerce can project outward globally, largely unhindered by major geopolitical rivals such as China or Russia. Policymakers should recognize this structural advantage, as it suggests a sustained capacity for the US to dictate global terms of engagement and maintain its leading role in international commerce.
中文摘要
本文質疑「全球競爭性勢力圈」的觀點，主張美國維持著單一且主導的勢力範圍。這種主導地位根植於美國廣闊的本土區域，使其成為一個強大、不受限制的半球基地。因此，美國的實力與商業能夠向全球投射，而不會受到中國或俄羅斯等主要地緣政治競爭對手的重大阻礙。政策制定者應認識到這一結構性優勢，因為它暗示了美國持續制定全球參與規則和維持其國際商業領先地位的能力。
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