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The new disorder at sea and the limits of American sea power

Brookings | 2026-06-26 | china_indopacific

Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, United States

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English Summary

The article argues that American sea power faces limits not from singular crises, but from persistent "maritime disorder," a condition driven by three overlapping factors: coercive disruption, structural misalignment favoring China's industrial dominance, and systemic vulnerabilities in global infrastructure. These disorders are mutually reinforcing, eroding the underlying security of critical maritime chokepoints and supply chains. Consequently, simply rebuilding the fleet is insufficient; policy must shift from managing discrete crises to developing a comprehensive strategic framework that treats maritime disorder as a continuous operational reality. Failure to adopt this holistic approach risks allowing China to gain advantage in an increasingly contested global commons.

中文摘要

本文論述美國海權面臨的限制,並非源於單一危機,而是來自持續性的「海洋失序」。這種狀態由三個重疊因素所驅動:強制性擾動、結構性偏差(有利於中國的產業主導地位),以及全球基礎設施系統性的脆弱點。這些失序因素是相互強化的,正在侵蝕關鍵海域要衝和供應鏈的根本安全。因此,單純重建艦隊是不夠的;政策必須從管理個別危機轉向制定一套全面的戰略框架,將海洋失序視為一種持續運營的現實狀態。若未能採取這種整體性方法,美國恐會讓中國在日益競爭的全球公域中獲得優勢。

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