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The Stockpile Gap: How America Can Secure the Strategic Materials It Needs to Win

CFR | 2026-06-08 | defense

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English Summary

The CFR report, "The Stockpile Gap," argues that America’s significantly reduced strategic material stockpiles – particularly the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) – pose a critical vulnerability to coercion and conflict, highlighted by China’s export controls. The report recommends expanding and modernizing the NDS, establishing a strategic resilience reserve, and fostering greater private sector collaboration through initiatives like Project Vault to secure critical minerals and materials. Historically, stockpiling has been a vital element of U.S. national security, and current levels are insufficient to meet potential wartime or emergency needs, as evidenced by the Congressional Research Service’s findings. This necessitates a renewed commitment to building resilient supply chains and bolstering strategic reserves to mitigate future risks.

中文摘要

《戰略儲備缺口》(The Stockpile Gap) 這份美國戰ফে爾協會 (CFR) 報告指出,美國戰略物資儲備大幅縮減——特別是國防儲備庫 (NDS)——構成了對脅迫和衝突的關鍵弱點,並由中國的出口管制凸顯。報告建議擴大和現代化NDS,建立戰略韌性儲備,並通過如「Vault計畫」等項目的協同推動私營部門合作,以確保關鍵礦產和材料。歷史上,儲備一直是美國國家安全的重要組成部分,但目前的儲備水平不足以滿足潛在的戰爭或緊急需求,正如國會研究服務 (Congressional Research Service) 的調查結果所證明。這有必要重新致力於構建具有韌性的供應鏈,並加強戰略儲備,以降低未來風險。

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