ThinkTankWeekly

A new multilateralism. How are the UN and other global organizations adapting to a new world?

Chatham House | 2026-02-22 | society

Topics: Trade

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English Summary

The event’s core argument is that multilateral institutions, especially the UN system, must be structurally and politically updated to stay effective in a world shaped by great-power rivalry, fragmented governance, and fast technological and economic change. Its reasoning is that the current system is losing legitimacy and delivery capacity on cross-border problems such as climate and trade, while competing global orders are creating parallel venues for influence. The discussion points to practical adaptation priorities: reforming institutional representation, rebalancing decision-making power, and ensuring trade, technology, and development rules are perceived as fair across advanced and developing economies. For policymakers, the strategic implication is to treat multilateral reform as a competitiveness and stability agenda, investing in more inclusive, flexible institutions that can still coordinate collective action under geopolitical strain.

中文摘要

該活動的核心論點是:在一個由大國競爭、治理碎片化,以及科技與經濟快速變遷所塑造的世界中,多邊機構,尤其是聯合國體系,必須在結構與政治層面完成更新,才能維持有效性。其論證指出,現行體系在氣候與貿易等跨境問題上的正當性與執行能力正在流失,而相互競逐的全球秩序正創造出平行的影響力場域。討論因此提出務實的調適優先事項:改革制度代表性、重新平衡決策權力,並確保貿易、科技與發展規則在先進與發展中經濟體之間被視為公平。對政策制定者而言,其戰略意涵在於應將多邊改革視為一項關乎競爭力與穩定性的政策議程,並投資於更具包容性與彈性的制度,使其在地緣政治壓力下仍能協調集體行動。

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