ThinkTankWeekly

What Nouri al-Maliki’s prime minister bid tells us about Iraq

Chatham House | 2026-02-22 | diplomacy

Topics: Middle East, Trade

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English Summary

Chatham House argues that Nouri al-Maliki’s brief comeback bid exposed how Iraq’s political system remains highly vulnerable to external power competition despite official claims of restored sovereignty. The article cites Iran’s rapid backing of Maliki through networks tied to the Coordination Framework and PMF-linked actors, alongside Washington’s late but forceful intervention (including Trump’s public warning) to block an Iran-aligned outcome. It also frames Maliki’s candidacy as a break from Iraq’s post-2003 pattern of selecting weak consensus premiers, showing how quickly elite bargains can shift under foreign pressure. Strategically, the piece implies Iraq’s near-term stability depends on fast government formation, tighter management of militia-state fragmentation, and a balancing approach that reduces exposure to escalating US-Iran confrontation.

中文摘要

Chatham House主張,努里・馬利基(Nouri al-Maliki)短暫的回歸競逐,暴露出伊拉克政治體系儘管官方宣稱主權已恢復,仍高度易受外部強權競爭影響。文章指出,伊朗透過與「協調框架」(Coordination Framework)及與人民動員部隊(PMF)相關行動者相連的網絡,迅速支持馬利基;同時,華盛頓則在較晚階段但以強硬方式介入(包括川普的公開警告),以阻止親伊朗結果。文章亦將馬利基參選界定為對伊拉克2003年後偏好選擇弱勢共識型總理模式的突破,顯示在外部壓力下,菁英協議可迅速轉向。從戰略層面看,該文暗示伊拉克短期穩定取決於快速完成政府組建、加強管理民兵與國家體系碎片化,以及採取可降低暴露於美伊對抗升級風險的平衡策略。

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