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Global trade imbalances have changed since the 2008 financial crisis. Now they reflect new risks

Chatham House | 2026-06-08 | economy

Topics: Trade

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English Summary

This Chatham House analysis argues that global trade imbalances have fundamentally shifted since the 2008 financial crisis, moving beyond debt-fueled consumer excess to reflect new geopolitical and competitive risks. Evidence shows a narrowing US deficit alongside a rising Chinese surplus, driven by shifts in energy production and China’s ascendancy in global manufacturing. The primary risks now center on intensifying competition from Chinese firms, particularly impacting European industries like automotive and machinery, alongside the broader geopolitical implications of China’s economic dominance. Policy strategies must adapt to address these evolving imbalances, considering exchange rate adjustments and fostering industrial resilience.

中文摘要

本報告由智庫撰寫,認為自2008年金融危機以來,全球貿易失衡格局發生了根本性轉變,已不再僅僅是基於債務推動的消費者浪潮,而是反映了新的地緣政治和競爭風險。 數據顯示,美國赤字正在收窄,而中國的盈餘正在增加,這主要受到能源生產轉型以及中國在全球製造業崛起帶來的影響。 目前的主要風險集中在中國企業的日益激烈的競爭,特別對歐洲的汽車和機械產業產生影響,以及中國經濟主導地位所帶來的更廣泛的地緣政治影響。 政策應當適應這些不斷演變的失衡,考慮到匯率調整以及促進產業韌性。

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