ThinkTankWeekly

Economic Warfare and Military Power

CSIS | 2026-05-30 | china_indopacific

Topics: China, Europe, Russia, Trade, Ukraine, United States

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English Summary

The article argues that modern economic warfare (EW) is a strategic competition targeting the fundamental 'machinery'—the flows of capital, materials, and technology—used by rivals to convert resources into military power, rather than attacking fielded forces directly. To maximize utility, policymakers must adopt three core principles: fungibility, elasticity, and market making, while ensuring transaction-level visibility to prevent adversaries from evading sanctions. Strategically, the U.S. must harmonize the traditionally contradictory logics of open markets and coercive warfare by leveraging private finance to accelerate the production of critical goods. This requires operationalizing economic pressure by identifying decisive economic pressure points and applying them carefully to constrain rivals without destabilizing allied markets.

中文摘要

本文主張,現代經濟戰(EW)是一種戰略競爭,其目標是針對對手將資源轉化為軍事力量所依賴的根本「機制」——即資本、物資和技術的流動,而非直接攻擊其已部署的戰力。為最大化效用,政策制定者必須採納三個核心原則:可替代性、彈性以及市場建構,同時確保交易層級的可視性,以防止敵對勢力規避制裁。從戰略角度來看,美國必須透過利用私人金融,加速關鍵商品的生產,從而調和傳統上相互矛盾的開放市場邏輯與強制性戰事邏輯。這要求透過識別決定性的經濟壓力點,並謹慎地施加壓力,來操作經濟壓力,從而約束競爭對手,同時避免破壞盟國市場的穩定。

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