The article argues that the post-Cold War era of U.S. unipolarity, established by the perceived invincibility demonstrated during the Gulf War, has ended. This decline is driven by globalization and technological diffusion, which have democratized advanced military capabilities, allowing regional actors to challenge major powers. Consequently, policymakers must prepare for a more volatile international order marked by frequent crises, heightened costs for securing global trade chokepoints, and reduced predictability from American power. The new rules dictate that great powers can no longer effortlessly impose their will through force.
New World New Rules: Global Cooperation in a World of Geopolitical Rivalries
English Summary
The analysis argues that while global multilateral economic institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO) are failing to adapt to modern challenges like climate change and digital innovation, preserving and updating them remains critical due to global interdependence. Cooperation is shown to be effective when countries share a clear understanding of a problem, establish transparent processes, and pool expertise, as demonstrated by successes in bank regulation and tax competition. Consequently, while institutional reform is necessary, policymakers must also prepare for and facilitate action by 'coalitions of willing countries' to safeguard the global commons when established multilateral frameworks prove inadequate.
中文摘要
本分析指出，儘管全球多邊經濟機構（如國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行、世界貿易組織）在適應氣候變遷和數位創新等現代挑戰方面面臨困境，但由於全球相互依賴性，仍維持和更新這些機構至關重要。研究顯示，當國家能夠就某一問題達成清晰共識、建立透明流程並匯集專業知識時，合作是有效的，這在銀行監管和稅收競爭的成功案例中得到了證明。因此，雖然制度改革是必要的，但政策制定者也必須為「意願國家聯盟」的行動做好準備並促進，以確保當既有的多邊框架不足時，仍能保護全球公共財。
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