The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Iran and the Hidden Cost of Wartime Access
English Summary
This Foreign Affairs article argues that the United States’ ability to wage war across vast distances hinges on permissive wartime access granted by host nations, a factor often overlooked in strategic discussions. The U.S. military has historically relied on countries like Uzbekistan, Kuwait, and Jordan to provide bases, transit routes, and logistical support, enabling operations in regions like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This access significantly reduces the costs and challenges associated with projecting military power, allowing for rapid deployment and sustained combat operations. However, the article warns that this reliance on permissive access increases the risk of the U.S. defaulting to military action, potentially leading to unwise interventions. Ultimately, restricting wartime access could limit U.S. global reach but also serve as a deterrent against unnecessary conflict.
中文摘要
這篇《外交事務》文章論述指出，美國維持跨大洋作戰能力的核心關鍵在於宿主國提供的便利的戰時訪問權，而這一因素在戰略討論中經常被忽視。歷史上，美國軍隊依賴如烏茲別克、科威特和約旦等國家提供基地、運輸路線和後勤支援，使該國得以在伊拉克、敘利亞和也門等地區展開作戰。這種訪問權顯著降低了美國投 środków軍事力量的成本和挑戰，使其能夠迅速部署並維持作戰行動。然而，文章警告指出，這種依賴便利訪問權會增加美國傾向於採取軍事行動的風險，可能導致不明智的干預。最終，限制戰時訪問權可能會限制美國的全球影響力，但同時也能作為避免不必要的衝突的威懾手段。
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