The Western Pacific remains a highly active theater defined by sustained U.S.-led military exercises and escalating great power competition. Key evidence includes continuous joint operations, such as RIMPAC 2026 in Hawaii and the deployment of CSGs into the South China Sea, juxtaposed with increased naval activity from both China (PLAN task groups) and Russia near Japan's critical straits. These movements underscore a strategic push by non-allied powers to assert presence and challenge regional norms. Policy implications dictate that allied nations must maintain robust multilateral cooperation and interoperability to safeguard freedom of navigation and manage escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
Why Putin Still Prefers War
English Summary
The article argues that Vladimir Putin's preference for conflict is a calculated strategic choice rather than an unavoidable geopolitical fate. It likely draws on historical diplomatic failures, contrasting periods of détente with current aggressive actions to demonstrate that confrontation is a policy decision. The analysis suggests that Russia views military conflict as a primary tool for achieving core national objectives, making purely diplomatic solutions insufficient. Policymakers must therefore adjust strategies to account for this deep-seated preference for confrontation, requiring robust deterrence and structural containment measures.
中文摘要
本文論述普京偏好衝突的傾向，並非不可避免的地緣政治宿命，而是一種經過計算的戰略選擇。分析可能援引歷史外交失敗的案例，將過去的緊張緩和時期與當前的侵略行動進行對比，以證明對抗本身就是一種政策決策。該分析指出，俄羅斯將軍事衝突視為實現核心國家目標的主要工具，使得純粹的外交解決方案顯得不足。因此，政策制定者必須調整戰略，以應對這種根深蒂固的對抗偏好，這要求實施強固的威懾和結構性的遏制措施。
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