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Why “China First” Will Fail

Foreign Affairs | 2026-06-26 | china_indopacific

Topics: China, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

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English Summary

The article argues that Beijing is pursuing a 'China first' strategy: maximizing global reach and projecting great-power status without assuming the binding commitments or costs of traditional superpower leadership. Evidence shows China avoids formal alliances, instead favoring flexible, transactional partnerships across diverse regions to expand influence while minimizing risk, particularly as US global confidence declines. While this approach offers short-term strategic advantages by allowing Beijing to maintain distance from regional crises, the analysis warns that it ultimately weakens alignment and fosters a more unstable international order, posing long-term risks to China's own interests.

中文摘要

本文論述北京正推行一項「中國優先」戰略:旨在最大化全球影響力並投射大國地位,卻不承擔傳統超級大國領導所附帶的具約束性承諾或成本。證據顯示,中國規避正式聯盟,轉而偏好在不同地區建立靈活、交易性的夥伴關係來擴大影響力,同時將風險降至最低,尤其是在美國全球信心逐漸衰退的背景下。雖然這種策略能讓北京在短期內從區域危機中保持距離,帶來戰略優勢;但分析警告指出,其最終會削弱地緣政治上的協調性,助長一個更不穩定的國際秩序,對中國自身的長期利益構成潛在風險。

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