The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
The Tragedy of Great-Power Foreign Policy
English Summary
The article argues that post-Cold War American foreign policy has been defined by an overreliance on projecting unmatched military and economic power to force global transformation. This strategy has manifested in two seemingly disparate approaches: promoting liberal institutions and free trade, or using military force for regime change and counter-terrorism. The core finding is that these two methods are fundamentally interconnected, suggesting a persistent and perhaps unsustainable pattern of interventionism. The implication is that the US's historical tendency to act as a global 'force for transformation' creates a strategic dilemma, or 'tragedy,' in defining its future role.
中文摘要
本文論述，冷戰後美國的外交政策一直以來，過度依賴投射無與倫比的軍事和經濟實力，以迫使全球進行轉型。這種戰略體現在兩種表面上看似不相關的途徑：一是推動自由主義制度和自由貿易；二是使用武力進行政權更迭和反恐。核心發現指出，這兩種方法本質上是相互關聯的，暗示著一種持續且或許難以持續的介入主義模式。其引申意義是，美國歷史上作為全球「變革力量」的傾向，在界定其未來角色時，創造了一個戰略困境，或可謂「悲劇」。
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