The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Winning the Next War: Overcoming the U.S. Air Force’s Capacity, Capability, and Readiness Crisis
English Summary
The Mitchell Institute argues that the U.S. Air Force has entered a severe force-generation crisis, describing it as the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history at a time of rising peer threats. The report’s core reasoning is that deterrence and warfighting credibility depend on balancing three linked factors: sufficient force size, modern combat capability, and day-to-day readiness, and that current shortfalls across all three create unacceptable operational risk. It recommends a dual fiscal shift: increase top-line Air Force funding and reallocate internal spending from RDT&E toward procurement and operations and maintenance to rebuild near-term combat readiness. Strategically, the paper warns that failing to act now will raise the probability of major U.S. losses in a future high-end conflict and weaken U.S. deterrence posture.
中文摘要
研究認為，美國空軍已陷入嚴重的兵力生成危機，並指出，在面臨日益嚴峻的同儕威脅之際，美國空軍正處於其歷史上兵力最老、規模最小、戰備最差的時期。報告的核心論點是，威懾和作戰可信度取決於三個相互關聯的因素之間的平衡：充足的兵力規模、現代化的作戰能力和日常戰備狀態。目前這三個面向均不足，造成了不可接受的作戰風險。報告建議採取雙重財政改革：增加空軍總預算，並將部分內部支出從研發、測試與評估（RDT&E）重新分配到採購和作戰維護，以重建近期戰備能力。從戰略層面來看，該報告警告稱，如果現在不採取行動，將增加美國在未來高端衝突中遭受重大損失的可能性，並削弱美國的威懾態勢。
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