The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Evaluation of the Networks for School Improvement Initiative—How Network Hubs Develop and Support Continuous Improvement Networks: Final Report
English Summary
This RAND final report evaluates the Gates Foundation's Networks for School Improvement initiative and argues that well-supported network hubs can improve school performance by sustaining continuous improvement practices across districts and schools. Drawing on multi-year evidence from 25 school networks, the study finds that hub quality, coaching breadth, data use, and strong network cohesion are closely associated with better perceived benefits and greater long-term sustainability. The report implies that education policymakers and philanthropic funders should invest not only in local school interventions but also in intermediary organizations that coordinate coaching, shared learning, and improvement routines. In strategic terms, durable school improvement requires national and district-level support for network infrastructure rather than one-off grant programs alone.
中文摘要
這份 RAND 最終報告評估蓋茲基金會的「學校改進網絡」計畫，主張若有足夠支援的網絡樞紐機構，便能透過跨學區與學校維持持續改進機制，進而提升教育成效。研究綜合 25 個學校網絡的多年期證據，發現樞紐品質、教練支持的廣度、資料使用能力，以及網絡凝聚力，皆與較高的成效感受及較強的長期延續性密切相關。這意味著教育決策者與資助方不應只投資單一學校方案，而應同步投資能協調教練、共享學習與改進流程的中介組織。就策略層面而言，持久的學校改進需要國家與學區層級對網絡基礎設施的支持，而不只是一次性的補助計畫。
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