The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Public natural catastrophe reinsurance: What other countries do
English Summary
A new Brookings/Hamilton Project paper by Adam Solomon examines how foreign governments use public reinsurance to address natural catastrophe insurance market failures, drawing lessons for a proposed U.S. federal reinsurance entity. Analyzing programs in Australia, the U.K., France, Spain, Japan, and elsewhere, Solomon finds that the most durable systems combine risk-based pricing, mandatory broad participation to prevent adverse selection, defined hazard coverage, and credible funding backstops such as industry levies and government guarantees. The paper concludes that well-designed public reinsurance can stabilize strained insurance markets by concentrating government capital on correlated tail risks while preserving private-sector underwriting and mitigation incentives—offering a viable policy path as U.S. property insurance becomes increasingly unaffordable or unavailable due to extreme weather.
中文摘要
布魯金斯學會／漢密爾頓計畫由 Adam Solomon 撰寫的新論文，探討各國政府如何運用公共再保險機制應對天然災害保險市場失靈，並為美國擬議設立的聯邦再保險機構汲取經驗。論文分析澳洲、英國、法國、西班牙、日本等國的制度後發現，最具持續性的體系皆結合風險定價、強制廣泛參與以防止逆選擇、明確的災害承保範圍，以及可靠的資金後盾（如行業徵費與政府擔保）。研究結論指出，設計完善的公共再保險能夠將政府資本集中於相關性尾部風險，同時維持民間承保與減災誘因，從而穩定承壓的保險市場——在極端天氣導致美國財產保險日益昂貴或難以取得之際，提供一條可行的政策路徑。
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