ThinkTankWeekly

Syria and the Levant

Chatham House | 2026-02-22 | diplomacy

Topics: Middle East, Russia

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English Summary

Chatham House argues that Assad’s abrupt fall in December 2024 revealed Syria’s state fragility, the limited capacity of Iran and Russia to sustain him, and the strategic failure of past Western policy. It reasons that Syria’s transition will be shaped by neighboring states—especially Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon—which see both security risks and geopolitical openings as a new government seeks reconstruction support. The analysis highlights Lebanon’s governance stress from Hezbollah’s weakening after conflict with Israel, and Jordan’s added vulnerability as U.S. policy under President Donald Trump may intensify West Bank dynamics. Policy strategy should therefore prioritize a genuinely Syrian-led political transition, disciplined regional burden-sharing, and early safeguards against spillover instability in Lebanon and Jordan while avoiding prior external policy mistakes.

中文摘要

研究所指出,阿塞德政權於2024年12月的突然垮台,暴露出敘利亞國家體制的脆弱性、伊朗與俄羅斯維持其統治能力的有限性,以及過去西方政策的戰略失敗。該文認為,敘利亞的轉型將由周邊國家塑造,尤其是土耳其、約旦、以色列與黎巴嫩;在新政府尋求重建支持之際,這些國家同時看到安全風險與地緣政治機會。分析強調,黎巴嫩在真主黨與以色列衝突後勢力走弱,致使其治理壓力加劇;同時,隨著美國總統唐納·川普政府的政策可能加劇西岸局勢,約旦的脆弱性也進一步上升。因此,政策策略應優先推動真正由敘利亞主導的政治轉型、推進有紀律的區域責任分擔,並及早建立防範機制,以遏止不穩定外溢至黎巴嫩與約旦,同時避免重蹈過去外部政策的覆轍。

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