ThinkTankWeekly

Political deadlock has left Iraq’s Kurdistan Region dangerously exposed amid Iran war

Chatham House | 2026-05-04 | middle_east

Topics: Middle East

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English Summary

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) faces extreme vulnerability due to a deep political deadlock between the KDP and PUK, which prevents the formation of a stable regional government. This internal disunity severely undermines the KRI's ability to project influence, manage domestic challenges, or resist the erosion of its autonomy by the federal government in Baghdad. Compounding this crisis, the KRI is under constant threat from Iran-backed militias, while Baghdad simultaneously curtails its financial and oil export controls. Consequently, the KRI lacks a unified front to negotiate with regional powers or international actors, increasing the risk of a major political or security rupture.

中文摘要

伊拉克庫德斯坦地區(KRI)因庫德斯坦民主黨(KDP)與人民聯合黨(PUK)之間深層的政治僵局而面臨極度脆弱的處境,此僵局阻礙了穩定區域政府的建立。這種內部不和嚴重削弱了KRI投射影響力、管理國內挑戰,或抵抗巴格達聯邦政府侵蝕其自主權的能力。更雪上加霜的是,KRI持續受到伊朗支持的民兵組織威脅,而巴格達同時也在收緊其財政和石油出口管制。因此,KRI缺乏一個統一的陣線來與區域大國或國際行為者進行談判,這增加了發生重大政治或安全破裂的風險。

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