The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
The Islamic Republic’s Power Centers
English Summary
CFR’s core finding is that Iran’s system is institutionally complex but functionally centered on the supreme leader’s clerical-security network, which constrains elected officials and limits meaningful reform. The article’s reasoning maps how formal bodies—the presidency, majlis, Guardian Council, Expediency Council, Assembly of Experts, and Supreme National Security Council—are structurally shaped by appointment authority, candidate vetting, and IRGC-linked influence tied to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It argues that recent shocks, including the June 2025 Israeli strikes and the late-2025/2026 protest wave, exposed regime vulnerabilities, yet the state’s coercive response also demonstrated enduring control by hard-line power centers. The policy implication is that strategy toward Tehran should focus on the supreme leader’s orbit and security institutions, combining calibrated pressure and diplomacy while preparing for episodic instability rather than expecting elected offices alone to drive change.
中文摘要
外交關係協會（CFR）的核心發現是：伊朗體制在制度層面雖然複雜，但在實際運作上以最高領袖主導的教士—安全網絡為中心，因而牽制民選官員並限制具實質意義的改革。文章論證梳理了正式機構——總統職位、伊斯蘭議會（Majlis）、監護委員會、權宜委員會、專家會議與最高國家安全委員會——如何在任命權、候選人審查，以及與阿亞圖拉阿里・哈米尼相連並受伊斯蘭革命衛隊（IRGC）影響的權力結構下被塑造。文章主張，近期衝擊（包括2025年6月以色列的打擊行動，以及2025年底至2026年的抗議浪潮）暴露了政權脆弱性；然而，國家以強制手段回應，也顯示強硬派權力核心仍具持久控制力。其政策意涵是：對德黑蘭的策略應聚焦最高領袖權力圈與安全機構，在校準式施壓與外交並行下，同時為間歇性不穩定預作準備，而非期待僅靠民選職位推動變革。
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