The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
How I Got My Career in Foreign Policy: Jessica Brandt
English Summary
Jessica Brandt's career evolution—from CFR researcher to Director of ODNI's Foreign Malign Influence Center—illustrates how technology has become a central domain of US geopolitical competition. Her work focused on foreign information warfare and technology-enabled asymmetric competition between democracies and authoritarian regimes, particularly through social media platforms and election interference. Brandt's trajectory demonstrates that technology is now inseparable from traditional foreign policy concerns, requiring practitioners with hybrid expertise spanning government, think tanks, and civil society. She emphasizes that emerging tech policy challenges require adaptability, as issues like AI and digital influence operations present novel problems that outpace traditional policy frameworks. Her advice to younger policymakers highlights the importance of technological literacy and willingness to pivot toward emerging national security threats in 21st-century foreign policy.
中文摘要
傑西卡·布蘭特的職業發展軌跡—從美國外交關係委員會研究員至美國國家情報局外國惡意影響中心主任—說明了科技如何成為美國地緣政治競爭的核心領域。她的工作聚焦於外國信息戰爭以及民主制度與專制政權間的科技驅動非對稱競爭，特別是通過社交媒體平台和選舉干預進行的競爭。布蘭特的職業軌跡表明，科技如今與傳統外交政策關切密不可分，需要具備跨越政府、智庫和民間社會的複合型專業知識的從業人員。她強調，新興科技政策挑戰需要適應能力，因為人工智能和數字影響力操作等議題帶來的新問題超越了傳統政策框架的應對範圍。她對年輕政策制定者的建議強調了科技素養的重要性，以及在21世紀外交政策中靈活應對新興國家安全威脅的必要性。
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