Congress has significantly expanded presidential tariff authority by passing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, allowing the executive to impose up to 100% tariffs on key buyers of Russian energy and sanctions enablers. The article argues that this legislation represents a dangerous abdication of Congress's Article I authority, as it grants the executive vast, discretionary power without specifying criteria for enforcement. Historically, the executive could claim tariffs were its own doing; however, by writing and passing this new authority, Congress now owns the resulting trade policy and its economic consequences. This shift implies that future tariffs will be viewed by the public as a direct legislative action, potentially undermining the administration's credibility and creating political vulnerability.
Technology governance
English Summary
Chatham House argues that technology governance has expanded from a narrow cyber focus into a broad policy domain because the internet now underpins government, private-sector, and civil-society activity. It notes that while debate is often framed as national security versus personal privacy, a more significant challenge is the market dominance of US technology firms combined with weak and inconsistent regulation. The analysis implies that existing governance approaches are poorly matched to transnational platform power and produce legal uncertainty across jurisdictions. Strategically, policymakers should pursue more coordinated cross-border rules and stronger accountability and competition frameworks for dominant tech companies.
中文摘要
研究所認為，科技治理已從狹義的網路領域擴展為更廣泛的政策範疇，因為網際網路如今已成為政府、私部門與公民社會運作的基礎。報告指出，雖然相關辯論常被框架為國家安全與個人隱私之爭，但更重要的挑戰在於美國科技企業的市場支配地位，以及監管體系的薄弱與不一致。該分析意涵顯示，現行治理模式與跨國平台權力並不相稱，並在各司法管轄區造成法律不確定性。就策略而言，政策制定者應推動更協調的跨境規則，並針對主導型科技企業建立更強的問責與競爭制度框架。
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