The Western Pacific remains a highly active theater defined by sustained U.S.-led military exercises and escalating great power competition. Key evidence includes continuous joint operations, such as RIMPAC 2026 in Hawaii and the deployment of CSGs into the South China Sea, juxtaposed with increased naval activity from both China (PLAN task groups) and Russia near Japan's critical straits. These movements underscore a strategic push by non-allied powers to assert presence and challenge regional norms. Policy implications dictate that allied nations must maintain robust multilateral cooperation and interoperability to safeguard freedom of navigation and manage escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
The EU’s IRGC terrorist designation marks a major shift on Iran
English Summary
The article argues that the EU’s 2026 designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization marks a decisive break from three decades of engagement-based Iran policy. It says Europe’s old balance of pressure and dialogue collapsed after cumulative shocks: Iran’s military support to Russia after 2022, repression following Mahsa Amini’s death, failure to restore the nuclear deal in 2023, and UN snapback sanctions in 2025. The immediate trigger was the scale of the early-2026 crackdown, which convinced European governments there were no credible Iranian interlocutors left and that non-designation carried unacceptable reputational costs. Strategically, the move raises legal and compliance risks for EU and non-EU firms tied to Iran while likely reducing the EU’s diplomatic leverage, leaving Europe more sidelined in US-Iran decision-making.
中文摘要
該文主張，歐盟於2026年將伊朗伊斯蘭革命衛隊（IRGC）列為恐怖組織，標誌著歐洲對伊政策與過去三十年「接觸優先」路線的決定性斷裂。文章指出，在一連串累積性衝擊下，歐洲原有「施壓與對話並行」的平衡已告瓦解，包括：2022年後伊朗對俄羅斯提供軍事支持、瑪莎・阿米尼之死後的鎮壓、2023年恢復核協議失敗，以及2025年聯合國啟動「快速恢復制裁」（snapback）。直接導火線則是2026年初鎮壓規模之大，使歐洲各國政府認定已無可信的伊朗對話對象，且若不列名將承擔不可接受的聲譽成本。從戰略層面看，此舉提高了與伊朗有關聯之歐盟與非歐盟企業的法律與合規風險，同時可能削弱歐盟的外交槓桿，進一步使歐洲在美伊決策中被邊緣化。
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