ThinkTankWeekly

As Iran war reshapes the Middle East, Turkey’s regional role looks set to expand

Chatham House | 2026-06-08 | middle_east

Topics: Middle East

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English Summary

As the Iran war reshapes the Middle East, Turkey is poised to expand its regional influence, driven by concerns over Iran’s attempts to redefine regional security dynamics, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Evidence suggests Turkey fears a prolonged conflict and regional instability, leading to increased security partnerships and defense industry cooperation with Gulf states – a move partially motivated by a desire to diversify away from US security guarantees. Furthermore, the conflict is fueling opportunities for Turkey to expand its role in regional connectivity projects, such as trade corridor redesigns and transport networks, exemplified by initiatives like the Iraq Development Road and the Middle Corridor. This expansion is also underscored by the formation of new regional alignments, like the Turkey-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Egypt quartet, aimed at shaping post-war geopolitics.

中文摘要

随着伊朗战争重塑中东,土耳其正有机会扩大其地区影响力,这主要源于土耳其对伊朗试图重新定义地区安全格局,特别是就霍尔木兹海峡的争端所抱有的担忧。证据表明,土耳其担心冲突将持续不断,并导致地区不稳定,从而促成了与海湾国家加强安全伙伴关系和国防工业合作,这部分也受到其希望摆脱美国安全保障的动机驱动。此外,这场冲突也为土耳其在地区互联互通项目中的作用提供了机会,例如贸易走廊的重新设计和交通网络,如伊拉克发展公路和中线项目。这种扩张也体现在新的地区联盟的形成上,例如土耳其、巴基斯坦、沙特阿拉伯和埃及的四方合作,旨在塑造战后地缘政治格局。

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