ThinkTankWeekly

Global cooperation on nuclear disarmament looks even further away

Chatham House | 2026-06-08 | diplomacy

Topics: Nuclear

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English Summary

The 2026 NPT Review Conference failed to reach consensus, marking the third consecutive unsuccessful outcome and signaling a significant deterioration in global efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Key evidence points to a fractured international environment, exacerbated by disputes over Iran, Ukraine, and North Korea, with the ‘P5’ states actively resisting commitments to disarmament. The expiration of New START without a replacement, coupled with accelerating nuclear build-ups by China and other nations, further weakened the NPT regime and the ‘grand bargain’ of non-proliferation in exchange for disarmament. Ultimately, the conference highlighted a shift towards bilateral leverage among major powers, diminishing the effectiveness of consensus-based multilateral processes.

中文摘要

2026年《不拡散條約》審查會議未能達成共識,標誌著第三次失敗結果,並預示著全球對核裁軍努力的顯著惡化。關鍵證據表明,國際環境呈現分裂,主要受到伊朗、烏克蘭和朝鮮等爭端加劇的影響,而‘五國’國家積極抵制裁軍承諾。新START條約到期且沒有替代方案,同時中國和其他國家的核武器擴張加速,進一步削弱了《不拡散條約》的效力以及非核裁軍換取裁軍的‘大交易’。最終,會議凸顯了主要大國之間雙邊權力提升的趨勢,削弱了以共識為基礎的多邊程序效力。

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