Despite significant damage to its naval fleet, shipyards, and production facilities from recent strikes, Iran is expected to quickly reconstitute its military industrial base. This reconstitution relies heavily on importing dual-use components, such as machine tools, drone parts, and marine engines, through alternative routes like Pakistan or China. To counter this threat, the report advises that policymakers must extend sanctions mechanisms—particularly 'no reexport' clauses—and proactively engage third countries with direct access to Iran. Furthermore, monitoring allied firms dealing with key suppliers in China and Turkey is crucial to slowing down and raising the cost of necessary procurements.
Strange Stability: How Cold War Scientists Set Out to Control the Arms Race and Ended Up Serving the Military-Industrial Complex
English Summary
The analysis examines how Cold War scientists reframed nuclear policy, arguing that the goal was not disarmament, but rather stabilizing the arms race through controlled deterrence. While these thinkers provided valuable intellectual frameworks for policymakers, their actual influence on nuclear decision-making was less pronounced than commonly believed. The core finding is that the concept of 'stability' allowed analysts to organize thought, even if they were skeptical of total disarmament. For policy, this suggests that understanding the political dynamics that sideline scientific input is crucial for developing modern arms control strategies and managing great power competition.
中文摘要
本分析探討了冷戰科學家如何重新定義核政策，其論點認為其目的並非實現裁軍，而是透過受控威懾來穩定軍備競賽。儘管這些思想家為政策制定者提供了寶貴的知識框架，但他們在核決策過程中的實際影響力，不如一般普遍認為的那麼顯著。核心發現指出，「穩定性」這一概念使分析師能夠組織思維，即使他們對徹底的裁軍持懷疑態度。對於政策制定而言，這表明了解那些將科學輸入排除在外的政治動態，對於發展現代軍備控制戰略和管理大國競爭至關重要。
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