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The barriers and facilitators to supporting, commissioning and working with Lived Experience Recovery Organisations in systems of care in England

RAND | 2026-04-22 | health

Topics: Europe, Indo-Pacific, Health

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English Summary

The report argues that Lived Experience Recovery Organisations (LEROs) are vital components of recovery-oriented systems of care, but their integration is hampered by systemic barriers, primarily a lack of consistent definition among stakeholders. Key evidence shows that the sustainability and autonomy of LEROs are highly dependent on funding models; stable, direct commissioning is crucial, whereas fragmented or short-term grants lead to instability and limited visibility. For policy, the findings imply that authorities must standardize LERO definitions and shift away from fragmented funding. Strategic commissioning must prioritize direct, ring-fenced allocations to ensure LEROs maintain autonomy and consistent engagement within the local care system.

中文摘要

本報告指出,生活經驗復原組織(LEROs)是復原導向照護系統不可或缺的組成部分,但其整合面臨系統性障礙,主要源於利益相關者之間缺乏一致的定義。關鍵證據顯示,LEROs的可持續性與自主性高度依賴於其資金模式;穩定的直接委託撥款至關重要,而零散或短期資助則會導致不穩定和能見度受限。從政策層面來看,研究結果暗示當局必須標準化LEROs的定義,並擺脫碎片化的資助模式。策略性委託應優先考慮直接、專款專用的撥款,以確保LEROs能在地方照護系統中維持自主性與持續的參與度。

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