The White House (via OMB) strongly protests Congressional efforts within the FY 2027 NDAA to prohibit the purchase of warships from foreign shipyards. The Administration argues that these restrictions undermine national security by limiting flexibility and hindering its strategy of leveraging allied yards, such as in the 'Finland model,' to drive investment into U.S. shipbuilding capacity. This signals a significant policy shift toward integrating international partners into advanced naval construction, suggesting the Pentagon is prepared to bypass traditional domestic build requirements for future combat vessels.
Cost–benefit analysis for synthetic nucleic acid screening in the European Union
English Summary
A RAND cost-benefit analysis on synthetic nucleic acid screening in the European Union concludes that increased screening coverage yields significant societal benefits by reducing harm from biological accidents and misuse. Mandatory EU-wide regulation is projected to deliver the largest net benefits, estimated at €4.6 billion annually, significantly surpassing voluntary or conditional approaches. This is primarily due to the non-linear effects of near-universal coverage, which generates disproportionate risk reductions through direct detection and deterrence, with every €1 spent yielding €6 in avoided losses. The findings provide a strong economic rationale for EU-level intervention, supporting mandatory screening requirements, potentially through the EU Biotech Act, while emphasizing the need for proportionate implementation to minimize disruption to legitimate research and innovation.
中文摘要
一份關於歐盟合成核酸篩檢的蘭德成本效益分析指出，提高篩檢覆蓋率能顯著降低生物意外和濫用造成的危害，從而產生可觀的社會效益。預計實施歐盟範圍內的強制性法規將帶來最大的淨效益，估計每年可達46億歐元，遠超自願或有條件的做法。這主要歸因於近乎普及的覆蓋率所產生的非線性效應，透過直接檢測和威懾，帶來不成比例的風險降低，每投入1歐元即可避免6歐元的損失。這項研究結果為歐盟層面的干預提供了強有力的經濟依據，支持實施強制性篩檢要求，可能透過《歐盟生物技術法案》進行，同時強調需要採取適當的實施措施，以最大限度地減少對合法研究和創新的干擾。
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