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Achieving Combat Sortie Generation Proficiency in the Air Force: An Examination of Goals, Gaps, Barriers, and Solutions

RAND | 2026-03-25 | defense

Topics: Climate, Europe, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, NATO, Nuclear, Russia, Trade, United States, Defense

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English Summary

RAND research identifies critical gaps in U.S. Air Force combat sortie generation proficiency—the ability to rapidly recover, refuel, rearm, and launch aircraft under combat conditions. Through expert interviews, literature review, and proficiency modeling, the authors find that current training practices vary inconsistently across units and fall far short of what Agile Combat Employment doctrine demands, particularly for rapid response to high-threat missile scenarios. Key barriers include lack of standardized training requirements, insufficient training frequency (units practicing hot integrated combat turns semi-annually when monthly or more is needed), resource constraints, personnel shortages, and organizational friction between operations and maintenance. The report recommends establishing formal CSG training requirements (similar to the Ready Aircrew Program), implementing standardized proficiency metrics, improving operational-maintenance coordination to resolve conflicts with flying hour programs, and addressing long-term personnel experience imbalances. Without systematic intervention, the Air Force will struggle to generate combat power at the speed and scale required for peer conflict.

中文摘要

RAND研究發現美國空軍戰鬥出動生成能力存在重大缺口——指在戰鬥條件下快速恢復、加油、重新武裝並發射飛機的能力。通過專家訪談、文獻回顧及熟練度模型分析,作者發現當前訓練做法在各單位間存在不一致變化,遠低於敏捷戰鬥就業教義的要求,特別是應對高威脅飛彈場景的快速反應。主要障礙包括缺乏標準化訓練要求、訓練頻率不足(單位每半年進行一次熱綜合戰鬥轉換訓練,而實際需要每月或更頻繁進行)、資源限制、人員短缺,以及作戰與維護單位間的組織協調問題。報告建議建立正式的編隊出動小組(CSG)訓練要求(類似於就緒飛行機組計畫),實施標準化熟練度指標,改進作戰與維護的協調以解決與飛行小時計畫的衝突,並解決人員經驗長期失衡問題。若無系統性干預,空軍將難以在對等衝突所需的速度和規模上生成戰鬥力量。

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